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Taxpayers William and Stacy Linton have won a
reversal of the summary judgment the district court
granted in favor of the government and have had
their case remanded to district court.1 On its
motion for summary judgment, the government
contended that the taxpayers made an indirect gift
of the transferred assets, rather than gifts of limited
liability company interests, and that the step
transaction doctrine applied. Although the Ninth
Circuit agreed with both parties that the sequenc-
ing of the taxpayers’ contributions of cash, stock,
and real property to their family LLC and their
transfer of LLC interests to their children’s trusts
determined the nature of their gifts,2 the appellate
court remanded the case because there were
genuine factual issues about the sequence of the
transactions that could not be decided by summary
judgment.3
The circuit court laid out the following dates and
events about the relevant transactions. The Lintons’
LLC was formed in November 2002. On January 22,
2003, they signed and dated several documents (a
quitclaim deed, an assignment of assets, and letters
authorizing security transfers and cash to the LLC),
but only signed without dating several others (trust
agreements for their children and gift documents of
11.25 percent of their LLC interests to each child’s
trust). The letters authorizing the stock transfers
were received by one investment bank on January
24, which made the transfers between that day and
January 31, and by another investment firm, which
apparently effected the transfers between January
24 and 29.4
Two or three months later, the taxpayers’ attor-
ney, Richard Hack, inserted January 22, 2003, on all
undated documents. Both he and the Lintons’ ac-
countant, who worked for Moss Adams LLP, testi-
fied in their depositions that the correct date was
January 31, 2003. Also, the LLC’s 2003 income tax
return, prepared by Moss Adams, indicated that the
Lintons’ contributions were first credited to their
individual capital accounts and then to their chil-
dren’s trusts’ capital accounts, and that each of the
taxpayers’ 2003 gift tax returns, prepared by Hack,
specified gifts of LLC interests occurring on January
31, 2003.5 The first row of the LLC’s ‘‘Membership
Interest Ledger,’’ prepared by Hack and containing
no dates, showed Mr. Linton as owning 100 percent
of the LLC when he contributed real estate and
portfolio assets and as transferring 50 percent of his
LLC interest to his wife; subsequent rows of the
ledger listed the taxpayers’ transfers of LLC inter-
ests to their children’s trusts. A share valuation
report, prepared by Moss Adams, showed the LLC
interests were transferred on January 31, 2003.
Relying on the express language of the trust
agreements and gift documents, the district court
1Linton v. United States, No. 09-35681 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), Doc 2011-1458, 2011 TNT 15-27, aff’g in part, rev’g in part,
and remanding 638 F. Supp.2d 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2009), Doc
2009-15152, 2009 TNT 126-15. (All pinpoints are to page num-
bers in the PDF version of the Ninth Circuit opinion in the Tax
Notes Today database.)
2Id. at 1222.
3Although the government also questioned the Lintons’
asserted valuation discounts for their gifts of LLC interests (they
had claimed a 47 percent lack of marketability and lack of
control discount), the valuation issue, however, was not ad-
dressed in the appeal because the summary judgment in favor
of the government on the indirect gift issue rendered the
valuation discount issue immaterial. Id. at 1225, n.2
4Id. at 1223-1224.
5Courts, however, have noted that after-the-fact evidence,
such as tax returns and reports, is undependable and not
considered very probative. See, e.g., Senda v. Commissioner, 433 F.
3d 1044, 1049 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2004-160. See
Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Return to Senda: Order Determinative for
FLP Discounts,’’ Tax Notes, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 781, Doc 2006-1385,
or 2006 TNT 20-40.
Wendy C. Gerzog is a professor at the University of
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The Ninth Circuit recently reversed the district
court’s summary judgment in favor of the government
in Linton on the issues of indirect gift and the appli-
cability of the step transaction doctrine. The circuit
court’s analysis focused on the taxpayers’ donative
intent. With that emphasis, the Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to determine the
sequence of the relevant transactions.
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held that the correct date for the trust creation and
gifts was January 22, 2003, and that the contribu-
tions of assets to the LLC occurred simultaneously
with, or subsequent to, the LLC interest gifts to the
Lintons’ children’s trusts.6 The district court also
applied the step transaction doctrine to conclude
that under any of the three tests of that doctrine, the
taxpayers made indirect gifts of the underlying
assets in the LLCs and observed that the taxpayers
‘‘made no affirmative decision to delay the gifts and
no evidence suggested the trust res was exposed to
real economic risk during the alleged interim be-
tween the contributions to the LLC and the gifts of
the LLC interests to the children’s trusts.’’7 Accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit, however, neither party was
entitled to summary judgment because the record
did not establish the date of the gift of the LLC
interests.8
Although noting that a completed gift for federal
gift tax purposes was not based on state law char-
acterization,9 the circuit court said that under Wash-
ington law, a completed gift requires (1) donor
intent to give (2) something capable of delivery, (3)
delivery, and (4) donee acceptance, and it pro-
ceeded to review each element. The court held that
the second element existed at all times during the
January 2003 transactions and that delivery, the
third element, involved an analysis of donor intent,
the first element, and ‘‘was at least present no later
than the intent to donate.’’10 Under Washington law,
the blank space might indicate ambiguity regarding
the delivery date, ‘‘especially if it determined the
delivery of an LLC interest by looking for an
objective manifestation of an intent to deliver.’’
Finally, the court held that donee acceptance, the
fourth and final element, was unquestioned by both
parties.11
Thus, to the court, donor intent was both pivotal
and unclear in Linton.12 Further, Washington law
does not adopt the Restatement’s subjective intent
test13; rather, Washington law determines donative
intent under an objective standard, ‘‘especially
where a writing exists.’’14 The court assumed, how-
ever, that other aspects of the Restatement applied
to Washington law. Under the Restatement, ‘‘execu-
tion of a gift document, alone, is not a sufficient
objective manifestation of an intent to donate.’’15 By
itself, a writing does not establish donative intent at
the time of the writing. Under the Restatement, that
generally requires delivery to the donee,16 and the
court did not see evidence of when the taxpayers
irrevocably ‘‘put the gift documents ‘beyond re-
trieval,’’’17 or showed they intended to make the
delivery effective. The court added that after sign-
ing the documents on January 22, the Lintons left
the papers with Hack, which the court suggested
might indicate a lack of intent to make a gift on that
date.18 On the other hand, while Hack’s testimony
in deposition was ‘‘that he later came to believe that
his client would have wanted the documents to be
dated January 31,’’19 Hack’s belief was contravened
by his other testimony that on January 22, Mr.
Linton didn’t know when he wanted to make the
gifts effective and by Hack’s inaction to make the
gifts effective on January 31. Finally, again assum-
ing Washington law reflected the Restatement, the
court stated that the gifts were more likely effective
in March or April, when Hack composed the
minute book.20
Once again, the court noted that federal law does
not need to adhere to state law to determine federal
tax liability.21 However, the court stated that be-
cause the record included conflicting conclusions
about when the taxpayers had donative intent as
required by state law, the government was not
entitled to summary judgment. Although the record
included the undated gift document, the court
framed this issue as whether ‘‘the accumulation of
objective circumstances was or was not sufficiently
complete before the LLC was funded.’’22
Also, the circuit court reversed the district court
on the application of the step transaction doctrine,
under any of its three tests, as inapplicable and
insufficient to the established facts.23 The conse-
quence of applying the step transaction doctrine is
to collapse several transactions into one for tax
purposes. The court discussed the three tests, any of
which if satisfied would require the application of
6Linton, No. 09-35681, 1225.
7Id. at 1226, citing 638 F. Supp.2d at 1290.
8No. 09-35681, at 1223.




13Id. at 1231, n.4.
14Id. at 1231.
15Id. at 1232.





21Id. at 1235, n.7.
22Id. at 1236.
23The court first acknowledged that it had grappled with
whether application of the doctrine to stipulated facts is a legal
or factual issue, but it said that under either standard of review,
it reversed the district court on the application of the step
transaction doctrine. Id. at 1241.
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the doctrine. Preliminarily, however, the court ob-
served that the government had not identified any
‘‘meaningless or unnecessary step that should be
ignored.’’24
Under the end result test, a court examines
whether a taxpayer’s series of steps were planned to
reach a desired outcome, to which a taxpayer’s
subjective intent would be significant, the court
noted. Here, the Lintons wanted to give their chil-
dren LLC interests and at the same time deny them
control of the LLC or its assets. According to the
court, merging the steps here would produce a win
for the taxpayers; that is, to tax their gifts as gifts of
LLC interests.25 Applying the interdependence test,
in which the court looks at whether the steps were
so interdependent that legal consequences would
depend on the completion of the entire series of
events, the court compared the events in Linton to
those in bona fide business third-party transactions
and said that creating an LLC is ‘‘a reasonable
business activity.’’26 The Tax Court in Holman27 said
that such an activity ‘‘was not necessarily ‘fruitless’
even if done in anticipation of gifting partnership
interests to the taxpayers’ children.’’28 As such, the
taxpayers’ plan did not satisfy the interdependence
test. Finally, the court found the binding commit-
ment test inapplicable because the test applies only
when the series of transactions extend over several
years, and all the taxpayers’ actions occurred within
weeks or not more than several months.
At the same time, the circuit court also rejected
the Lintons’ failed gift argument that they were
entitled to summary judgment because the LLC
agreement only allowed their capital accounts to
have been credited; thus, regardless of the order of
the transfers, there was no gift and hence, no gift tax
liability.29 The court held that tax law does not
depend on the formalities of title and that all
concerned acted as if the taxpayers had transferred
their assets beyond recall.30
Thus, having reversed the summary judgment in
favor of the government both on the indirect gift
and the step transaction doctrine issues and having
affirmed the summary judgment against the tax-
payers on their failed gift theory, the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court to determine
when the taxpayers initially and objectively showed
their intent to effectuate their gifts.
Holman
Holman involved three issues: (1) whether the
assets transferred to the family limited partnership
were gifts of FLP interests or indirect gifts of Dell
stock; (2) the value of those gifts; and (3) in deter-
mining the value of the gifts, whether the FLP
agreement restrictions should be ignored under
section 2703.31
On the indirect gift issue, the Holman court held
that the taxpayers followed the proper order to
convey a partnership interest. When the partner-
ship was formed and the Dell shares transferred,
the Holmans and the trustee of the children’s trust
‘‘received partnership interests proportional to the
number of shares each transferred to the partner-
ship.’’32 Five days later, the Holmans made gifts of
their limited partnership interests. The court found
that they had neither reversed that order nor simul-
taneously made both transfers.
Moreover, the court rejected the application of
the step transaction doctrine to find an indirect gift
of the stock itself to the taxpayers’ children. The
court interpreted the government’s argument as
invoking the interdependence test, but rejected the
application of the step transaction doctrine. Al-
though the court recognized that the Holmans
created the FLP to make gifts of their FLP interests
to their children, it declined to find that the legali-
ties effected by the FLP agreement would have been
useless without the taxpayers’ 1999 gift.33 More-
over, the court considered that the government’s
decision not to argue indirect gifts of the similar
sequence of the 2000 and 2001 transfers may have
indicated its implicit acceptance of the independent
significance of those two steps.
The court distinguished Senda v. Commissioner34
because the transfer of stock to the partnership in
Holman did not occur on the same day as the gift of




27Holman v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 170 (2008), Doc 2008-11723,
2008 TNT 103-6, aff’d, 601 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2010), Doc 2010-7656,
2010 TNT 67-11.
28Linton, No. 09-35681 at 1241 (2011), citing Holman, 130 T.C.
170 at 188, 191 (2008).
29No. 09-35681, at 1236-1237.
30Id. at 1238.
31In Holman, the court applied section 2703 to the restrictions
the taxpayers placed in paragraph 9.3 of their FLP agreement.
Unlike in Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977), and Amlie v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-76, Doc 2006-7345, 2006 TNT
74-9, the Holman court held that in contravention of section
2703(b)(1), its restrictions did not assist a bona fide business
arrangement of the taxpayers; moreover, the court held in
contravention of section 2703(b)(2) that they were a device to
transfer property to their children for less than adequate con-
sideration. That being the case, the partnership interests were
valued without regard to a discount for the restrictions in that
paragraph of the FLP agreement.
32130 T.C. at 187 (2008).
33Id. at 188.
34T.C. Memo. 2004-60, Doc 2004-14321, 2004 TNT 134-11, aff’d,
433 F.3d 1044 (2006), Doc 2006-436, 2006 TNT 5-12.
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FLP formation, the taxpayers’ transfers of Dell stock
to the FLP, and the taxpayers’ transfers of FLP
interests all occurred within a week of each other
did not change that result. The court emphasized
that the value of the FLP interests fluctuated be-
tween November 2 and November 8, 1999, and
during that period, the taxpayers shouldered the
risk of a change in value. Therefore, the Holman
court held that the taxpayers had made gifts of their
FLP interests and not of the underlying assets.
Step Transaction Doctrine
In Penrod35 the government argued that two
events — the taxpayers’ purchase and sale of Mc-
Donald’s stock — should be merged as one trans-
action, causing several negative tax consequences,
while the taxpayers contended that they were two
separate and independent transactions.36 The court
considered the application of all three variations of
the step transaction doctrine and found that there
was no binding commitment to sell the stock and
that at the time of the acquisition, the taxpayers did
not intend to sell their stock but instead only chose
to do so later because of subsequent events. There-
fore, the court held that none of the three tests
required the application of the step transaction
doctrine, which would have combined the two
steps.37 Consequently, the court held that there was
a continuity of interest as required for the acquisi-
tion of the stock to qualify as a reorganization under
section 368(a)(1)(A).
In Senda the Eighth Circuit held that the Tax
Court had properly used the step transaction doc-
trine to determine the character of the transferred
property. The court held that the lower court’s
findings that the transactions were integrated and
concurrent were thoroughly corroborated by the
facts. While the taxpayers contended that applica-
tion of the doctrine was restricted to identifying the
donor or donee in a gift tax case, the appellate court
cited two of its opinions,38 wherein the court main-
tained that its application extended to resolving the
nature of the transferred property.39 ‘‘In sum, the
Sendas’ proposed limitation would be contrary to
the precedent of the Supreme Court, which calls the
step-transaction doctrine ‘‘well-established’’ and
‘‘expressly sanctioned.’’40
In Holman the Tax Court refused to apply the step
transaction doctrine to find an indirect gift of stock
to the taxpayer’s children. The court interpreted the
government’s argument as adopting the interde-
pendence test but refused to conclude that ‘‘the
legal relations created by the partnership agreement
would have been fruitless had petitioners not also
made the 1999 gift.’’41 The court speculated that the
government’s decision not to argue indirect gifts for
the taxpayer’s 2000 and 2001 transfers of similar
sequence implicitly accepted the independent sig-
nificance of the two transfer events.42 Also, the
court emphasized that the value of the FLP interests
fluctuated between November 2 and November 8,
1999, during which time the taxpayers bore that
risk.43
Finally, in Gross v. Commissioner,44 the govern-
ment argued that the taxpayer made an indirect gift
either in fact or under the step transaction doctrine.
However, the court rejected both arguments. The
court agreed with the taxpayer on the timing of the
two transactions and held that the step transaction
doctrine did not apply because 11 days separated
the final transfers of the transferor’s stock to her
FLP and her gifts of partnership interests to her
daughters, and because the stocks were all, or
virtually all, ‘‘heavily traded, relatively volatile
common stocks.’’45
Analysis and Conclusion
Although the Ninth Circuit repeatedly stated that
a completed gift for federal gift tax purposes was
not determined by state law, much of the court’s
opinion discusses when a gift is complete under
state law.46 For the federal gift tax, donative intent
35Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415 (1987).
36Id. at 1427. (The determination of this issue would affect the
continuity of interest test required for the taxpayers’ acquisition
to qualify as a tax-deferred reorganization under section 368(a).
Under the government’s theory, the taxpayers would have had
to recognize gain from the exchange of their stock in 1975. The
benefits of a tax-deferred reorganization are derived from the
principle ‘‘that the shareholders of an acquired corporation have
not terminated their economic investment, but have merely
altered its form.’’) Id.
37Id. at 1434.
38Sather v. Commissioner, 251 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 2001), Doc
2001-16149, 2001 TNT 112-94. Estate of Schuler v. Commissioner,
282 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2002), Doc 2002-5859, 2002 TNT 46-18.
39Senda, 433 F.3d 1044, at 1049. See Schuler, 282 F.3d 575, at
579. In Sather and Schuler, the circuit court had applied the
reciprocal trust doctrine — which it considered a variant of the
doctrine of substance over form and which the Tax Court
referred to as the reciprocal transaction doctrine — to deny
additional annual exclusions for gifts made by the taxpayer and
his brother to each other’s children.
40Senda, 433 F.3d 1044, at 1049.
41Holman, 130 T.C. 170, 188 (2008).
42Id. at 189-190.
43Id. at 190-191; 191, n.7, Doc 2008-23927, or 2008 TNT 232-81.
44T.C. Memo. 2008-221, Doc 2008-20847, 2008 TNT 190-17. See
Gerzog, ‘‘Gross: FLP Sequence and Its Consequence,’’ Tax Notes
Dec. 1, 2008, p. 1075, Doc 2008-23927, or 2008 TNT 232-81.
45T.C. Memo. 2008-221, at 20, n.5.
46While the court recognized that Washington law differed
from the Restatement position on donative intent and that
Washington law placed more weight on documentary evidence,
COMMENTARY / ESTATE AND GIFT RAP
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has very limited relevance because the focus of the
inquiry is on whether there has been an unequal
exchange in money or money’s worth that would
deplete the transferor’s potential estate.47 An analy-
sis of donative intent for federal gift tax purposes is
made only when its absence indicates a business
transaction, which is exempt from the tax.48
Completion of a gift for gift tax purposes is deter-
mined under the principles of the gift tax regula-
tions that examine whether the donor has
relinquished control over his property such that he
cannot change its disposition or revest the property
in himself.49 Regarding the sequence of the two
transactions involved in creating and funding a
family LLC and the transfer of LLC interests in
one’s family members, case law such as Senda,
Holman, Gross, Jones,50 and Shepherd51 requires the
taxpayers to prove that the proper sequence of
events has manifestly occurred.
As the district court noted, Senda is very similar
to Linton. In Senda the sequence of events (that is,
partnership formation and property transfers) was
unclear; on that basis, the Tax Court held that the
transfers were indirect gifts.52 Although originally
undated, the pertinent documents in Linton were all
dated January 22, 2003, after the fact. While the
district court agreed to consider the taxpayers’
parol evidence for purposes of the motion for
summary judgment, the lower court said that it was
‘‘the express language of these documents [that]
establishes that the Trusts were created and the gifts
were made on January 22, 2003.’’53
Thus, despite the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on
donative intent and on what the taxpayers ulti-
mately wanted to do (that is, to do whatever was
necessary to obtain valuation discounts for their
gifts), applying gift tax principles and case law
precedent, Linton should be resolved in the govern-
ment’s favor.
the court continuously assumed the application of the Restate-
ment in describing the applicable state law. It is unclear how
much Washington law reflects the Restatement as assumed by
the Ninth Circuit. Of course, because a completed gift for gift tax
purposes is analyzed under different criteria, it is also unclear
how much of the discussion of the Restatement is determinative
here in any event.
47Likewise, common-law principles of consideration don’t
apply to the federal gift tax for the same reason.
48See reg. section 25.2512-8 (‘‘However, a sale, exchange, or
other transfer of property made in the ordinary course of
business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm’s length, and
free from any donative intent), will be considered as made for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s
worth.’’).
49Reg. section 25.2511-2. Indeed, for gift tax purposes, the
identity of the donee does not need to be then ‘‘known or
ascertainable.’’ Id.
50Estate of Jones II v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 121 (2001), Doc
2001-6611, 2001 TNT 45-12.
51Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 376 (2000), Doc 2000-
27642, 2000 TNT 209-15.
52No. 09-35681, 1283-1284.
53Id. at 1285.
COMMENTARY / ESTATE AND GIFT RAP




ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
